Southeast Asia Marginalized in US National Security Strategy, Analysts Warn of ‘Bargaining Chip’ Status
A new 32-page United States National Security Strategy document has sparked concern among geopolitical analysts due to its minimal mention of Southeast Asia. Appearing only twice within the comprehensive blueprint, the region’s limited visibility is being interpreted as a potential sign that Washington is relegating it to a mere “bargaining chip” in the increasingly complex US-China rivalry.
The National Security Strategy, released by the White House, outlines the current administration’s vision for bolstering “American economic independence” and preventing conflict in the Indo-Pacific. These are presented as the foundational pillars of its “America First” doctrine. While the document advocates for equitable global commerce and robust measures to “prevent war in the Indo-Pacific,” its treatment of Southeast Asia has drawn particular scrutiny.
The region is mentioned once in relation to China’s “enormous excess capacity” as a market, and again as a distinct area from Northeast Asia. This singular focus on China, to the apparent detriment of Southeast Asia’s specific interests, has been described as both disappointing and unsurprising by observers.
Shifting Priorities and Bilateral Engagements
Kevin Chen, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies’ US programme, noted that while previous US administrations emphasized supporting ASEAN centrality, the current approach signals a preference for engaging member states on a “bilateral level instead of the entire grouping.” This suggests that ASEAN’s long-standing aspiration for greater collective engagement with the United States may be taking a secondary position. It is anticipated that the current administration will continue to leverage tariffs and trade deals to foster closer economic ties with Southeast Asian nations.
The omission of specific country names, such as the Philippines, has also been highlighted as striking. Sarang Shidore, director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Programme, pointed out that the Philippines, a treaty ally, was only implicitly referenced as part of the “first island chain” – a critical defensive line against Chinese naval expansion extending from Japan through Taiwan to Indonesia.
Even the contentious South China Sea is discussed primarily in terms of preserving access to maritime corridors, rather than emphasizing sovereign rights or maritime jurisdiction under international law. This framing, according to Shidore, reflects Washington’s prioritization of safeguarding global trade routes over the intricacies of territorial claims. The strategy also notably fails to mention major Southeast Asian states like Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand.
A Narrowing Path for Southeast Asian Nations
Felix Chang, a senior fellow at the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, suggests that the US National Security Strategy reflects a reality where Washington’s capacity for military projection in Asia outstrips its willingness to commit economic resources. Unlike Beijing, which has been actively involved in direct economic investments, the US relies more on incentivizing the private sector.
This dynamic forces ASEAN member states, many of which are economically reliant on China for trade and Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure investments, to navigate an increasingly narrow path between the two global powers. Chang posits that the current administration appears less inclined to be swayed by attempts to play China and the US against each other. Consequently, Southeast Asian nations are not necessarily being compelled to “choose between China and the US, per se, but between true sovereignty and a version of it that is constrained by economic dependence on China.”
Shidore observes that the new security strategy clearly delineates Washington’s current focus: Latin America, Europe, and Russia. Asia, in this context, is largely viewed as a stage for economic competition with China. If this trajectory persists, the US security focus in Asia will primarily revolve around Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines as strategic nodes for denial – points designed to limit an adversary’s freedom of action during conflict.
“The rest of Asia is primarily seen as a site for righting trade imbalances and ensuring access to sea lanes and critical minerals,” Shidore added.
Economic Contestation and the Risk of Becoming ‘Bargaining Chips’
In essence, analysts interpret the strategy as revealing a US predominantly engaged in economic contestation with China, focused on securing resource access and managing a “competitive detente” with Beijing. This approach, according to observers, carries the significant risk of reducing Southeast Asia and its member states to mere “bargaining chips” in the larger geopolitical calculus.
Kevin Chen views the US national security blueprint as “almost entirely focused on China,” a tilt that could exacerbate concerns about a potential de facto “G2 arrangement” between the US and Beijing, where these two powers unilaterally determine the global order. However, Chen also emphasizes the need for more information, anticipating further clarity from upcoming national defense strategy and defense authorization act releases.
Operationally, Chen expects military cooperation, including joint drills with the Philippines and the revival of exercises with Cambodia, to continue under the semi-autonomous US Indo-Pacific Command, even in the absence of overarching strategic clarity. This, however, could also indicate a more fragmented approach to US strategy in the region.
Despite the National Security Strategy’s reduction in length from 67 pages in 2017 to 32 pages this year, analysts note that the underlying direction of US policy has remained consistent. Chang from the Foreign Policy Research Institute points out that US national security strategies often exhibit more continuity than significant shifts. The last major strategic recalibration, he notes, occurred in 2017 when China was explicitly designated as a strategic competitor. The fundamental principles, he argues, have not changed under subsequent administrations, only the emphasis.
The current document, Chang concludes, “emphasises support for regional allies, particularly those willing to take greater responsibility for their own defence and take demonstrable actions to that end.”
